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Abstract
PRACTICAL CHOICE OF A MEASURING METHOD FOR AERIAL SURVEYS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.
The necessity for quick aerial surveiIlance after an accidental release of radioactive material is generally
acknowledged. The measuring equipment used for this purpose should be abie to detect surface contaminations
of 1311 as low as 0.4 [lCi/m'. TiIl now portable survey meters and scintiIlation detectors of various sizes
have been used. However. it is difficult to compare the published resuits because the low detection limit
for 131 1 contamination depends on: the kind and size of the detector: the measuring method used; the compo-
sition and distribution of the fission products deposited: a knowledge of the background and its local variations;
and the influences of the actual Hight conditions.
Starting from a background survey with a helicopter and from ca libration measurements on a meteoro-
logieal tower with 1311 and 137 Cs point sourees. the sensitivity to surface contamination has been evaluated
for an energy-compensated G-M dose ratemerer and a scintiIIation detector. The lower detection limit and
the relative merits of measuring dose-rate, gross counts or the 1311 peak are discussed for various compositions
of fission products and actual f1ight conditions.
1. INTRODUCTION
After an accidental release of radionuclides to the environment it will
be necessary to know as soon as possible the extent of the contaminated
area and the amount of surface contamination, especially from the nuclide
1311. Therefore measurements are most suitably made from an aircraft.
Based on the experience gained after the Windscale reactor accident [1-5],
test flights and background measurements have been carried out in the past
years by several research establishments. These measurements were
performed with available equipment, e. g. with small portable instruments,
but also with large and expensive scintimeters. Starting from test flights
and calibrations at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre, the kind of
measuring equipment best suited for an aerial survey after a reactor accident
has been considered.
According to the permissible emergency levels in milk, a corresponding
deposition of 0.4 MCi/m2 of 1311 should be determined by an aerial survey.
Such a small surface activity produces a dose-rate of only a fr action of the
natural background, even at 1 m above ground. So it is obvious that the
praetically achievable lower deteetion limit is not just a property of the
detector alone, but depends largely on
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(i) A knowledge of the local background at the time of measurement
(ii) The kind of the emergency situation, especially the composition of
the released fission product mixture and the distribution over the
contaminated area
(iii) The flight conditions, such as speed and altitude of the aircraft, the
topography and how accurately the ground clearance can be main-
tained
(iv) The weather, which influences all these conditions.
Similar problems arise in aerial prospecting for uranium and with
general fall-out measurements [7]. These tasks and the measuring methods
applied are summarized in Fig. 1. The main difference may be seen in
the fact that the aerial surveys following a reactor accident have to be
carried out at once without losing time in preparation and regardless of
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FIG.1. Different kinds of radiation surveys.
Therefore the rich experience and sophisticated equipment and procedures
used .for uranium prospecting cannot be transferred directly to our purposes.
During most former test flights the total count rate of a scintillation
detector was recorded and the threshold has been set low enough to integrate
over the total stray radiation spectrum. As in a nuclear accident mainly
the detection of ground contamination by 1311 is of interest, we also examined
other measuring methods aiming for a comparison of the lower detection
limit practically achievable for 1311 surface contamination.
The following possibilities were considered in particular:
(I) Gamma spectroscopy for nuclide identification with a scintillation
detector
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(2) Seleetive measurement of 1311 with a scintillation detector and a
single-channel analyser set for the 360-keV peak
(3) Recording of the total count rate with a scintillation detector and an
integral discriminator
(4) True dose-rate measurement with an energy independent detector
(G-M counter with energy compensation filter).
As it is undesirable to contaminate a large area with fission produets
for test purposes, the calibration problem was solved in two steps:
(1) Determination of the 10wer detection limit for a surface contamination
under ideal conditions on a meteorological tower
(2) Consideration of the influences impairing the ideal conditions during
an actual flight over a contaminated area.
2. CALIBRATION EXPERIMENTS
To take into account the degradation of the speetra resulting from
radiation scattering and absorption, the calibration irradiations were carried
out under ideal conditions at a 200-m meteorological tower with point
sources. Two sources, one 5.8 Ci 131I and the other 10 Ci 137Cs, were
located on the ground at various distanc es from the tower. The height of the
detectors above ground was varied from 60 to 130 m, but most measure-
ments were made at a height of 80 m, corresponding to the flight altitude
assumed for the following discussion. The results of these point-source
calibrations we:re used to evaluate the sensitivity for a surface contamination
(l.J.Ci/m2 ). For this calibration run the available health physics equipment
was used.
The dose-rate instrument consisted of a large G-M counter tube,
type BZ 120, with an energy compensation filter so that the dose-rate indi-
cation is energy dependent only within ± 30% in the energy range of 25 ke V
to 1.2 Me V for all radiation incidences [8]. The logarithmic ratemeter
covers a range from 10 MR/h to 10 mR/h. Furthermore, a scintillation
detector with aNal crystal of 1.5 X 1.5 in. was used in connection with a
100-channel pulse height analyser. The crystal size is typical for portable
scintillation meters. The deteetion properties of larger crystals will be
considered in the discussion later on. The spectra were printed out in the
energy range from 50 to 900 keV (see Fig.2). From these spectra the gross
count rate together with the total and net count-rates under the 360-keV
1311 peak were derived. These values gave the calibration faetor for an
1311 point source for the cases of a dose-rate measurement, the measurement
of the total count rate and a selective 1311 measurement (see Table 1).
Proceeding from this point source calibration the calibration factors for
surface activities were determined numerically. For this purpose the
surface aetivity of a surface unit of 1 m 2 was represented by a point source.
The detector indication produced by such a surface unit is Imown from the
point source calibration. The integration over all surface units was done
by summarizing the contributions of concentric equidistant rings with a
width of 10 m. The results of Figs 3-5 show how the deteetor indication
varies with increasing radius at a height of 80 m above a homogeneously
contaminated circular area. Surface units with a radius larger than 350 m
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FIG.2. Gamma spectra of 1311 point source measured with a Nal(Tl) scintillalion detector (lt" X Hin.)
80 m above ground, source on the ground at various distances from the base of the tower.
TABLE I: CALIBRATION FACTORS FOR AN 1311 POINT SOURCE AND
AN HOMOGENEOUS INFINITE PLANE SOURCE OF 1311 MEASURED 80 m
ABOVE GROUND
G-M counter
Nal(TI) detector Nal(TI) detector
BZ 120
(H X Hin.) (H X Hin. )
under peak a total count rate
Background No 12 ~R/h 120 counts/min 3300 counts/min
Point source 1311 10,2 pR/h Ci 2100 counts/min Ci 6800 counts/min Ci
Plane source 1311
0.76 gR m' 42 counts m' 3100 counts m'
h ~Ci min ~Ci min ~Ci
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FIG, 3, Calibration of a dose ratemeter with a G-M counter type BZ 120 energy compensated far a surface
contamination of 131CS or 1311 80 m above ground depending on the radius of contaminated area,
soo300
NaI(T!) DETECTOR






























- RADIUS OF CIRClES (m)
FIG.4. Ca libration of a NaI(Tl) scintillation detector (11 x 11 in.), total count rate, for a surface conta-
mination of 137CS or 1311 80 m above ground depending on the radius of contaminated area.
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FIG.5. Calibration of aNal (Tl) scintillation detector (H x Hin. ),net count rate under peak, far a
surface contamination of t37CS or 1311 80 m above ground depending on the radius of contaminated area.
do not contribute to the detector indication. If the extension of the contamina-
ted area below the detector is larger than 350 m in all directions, the cali-
bration factor for an infinite plane source can be used (see Table I).
Under these ideal conditions the lower detection limit for an 1311 surface
contamination was assumed to be a detector indication which is equivalent
to twice the standard deviation of the natural background, 2 uo. = 2~.
We found the following values for the lower detection limit of 1311 (80 m
above ground, ratemeter time constant T = 15 sec):
0.74 JJ.Ci/m2
0.05 JJ.Ci/m2
G-M counter BZ 120
(dose-rate measurement)
NaI(TI) 1. 5 X 1. 5 in.
(peak, net count rate)
NaI (Tl) 1. 5 XL 5 in.
(total count rate)
The better detection limit of the scintillation detector was to be expected.
3. DETERMINATION OF THE LOWER DETECTION LIMIT FOR 1311
SURFACE CONTAMINATION UNDER FLIGHT CONDITIONS
3. 1. The different influences affecting the lower detection limit
The promising values of the lower detection limit found under ideal
conditions cannot be reproduced under practical conditions of a measuring
flight. The reallower detection limit for 131I surface contamination depends
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not only on the kind of detector and the measuring method, but also to a
large extent on other influences such as:
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(1) Influence of background level. The measuring accuracy of the net
count rate depends on the statistical deviation of the total count rate and
therefore on the amount of the background count rate, on the measuring
time or the tim.e constant of the measuring device.
(2) Local variations of the background, depending on the different
materials of the ground, the vegetation and the cultivation, owing to natural
radioactive materials and fall-out deposition.
(3) Temporal change of the background, caused by a change of the
natural radiation components resulting from weather conditions, seasons,
and influences of bad weather (wind, rain, mist) and by an additional depo-
sition or reduetion of global fall-out, the interim decrease of short-lived
fission product nuclides after the accident; by deeper penetration of the
deposited radionuclide into the ground, depending on the soH structure
and weather conditions.
(4) Composition of the deposited fission products. By additional fission
products, the background count rate of a selective 1311 measurement and the
net count rate for a non-selective measurement will be increased.
(5) Extension of the contaminated area. The smallest contaminated
area which can be detected depends on the plane speed, the time of measure-
ment and the time constant of the equipment.
(6) Influences of the flight conditions. The flight height and the variations
in the flight height caused by an inaccuracy of the height indicator, by hilly
ground, unfavourable weather conditions (wind, bad weather) and by
shielding of the detector by the plane itself.
In this paper, only the most significant influences of the background,
the time constant and influences of the emergency situation will be discussed
in detail. For this purpose we have assumed a reasonable flight height of
80 m above ground.
3.2. Background variation and time constant
Test flights carried out up to now in the neighbourhood of nuclear
research centres have shown that the local and temporal variations of the
natural background can exceed a factor of 3 [3,4,9]. The same variations
were observed for windy weather with showers [9]. Even starting from
background measurements made undercertain weather conditions (test
flight), it is not possible to deduce the particular background for a measuring
flight at a later time with the necessary accuracy.
We can obtain a very optimistic estimate of these error influences if
we assurne that the temporal and weather-dependent variations of the back-
ground can cause a doubling of the background count rate measured previously
[3]. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have information on the local distri -
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FIG 6. The 10IVer detection limit for 1311 surface contamination in MCi!m' derived from the variation
of the background -" N = N, 80 m above ground depending on the radius of contaminated area for different
detectors:
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G-M counter BZ 120, dose rate
Nal(TI) (H X Hin.), net count rate under 360-keV peak
Nal(TI) (1! X I! in.), total count rate
three Nal(T!) (4 5/8 X 1 in.) total count rate
In agreement with this experience - besides the statistical deviation of the
background 2 (Jo = 2JNo - the assumed background variation No has to be
taken into account as a basis for the calculation of the lower detection
limit.
Of course, the lower detection limit also depends on the time constant
of the rate:<neter. For this reason a long time constant seems desirable.
On the other hand, the time constant and the speed of the aircraft determine
the resolution for detecting small contaminated areas and therefore a short
time constant is desirable. But if we want to detect small contaminated
areas, we must bear in mind that for this case the lower detection limit
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increases rapidly and we cannot apply the calibration factor for an infinite
plane. Figure 6 shows the calculated lower detection limit depending on
the radius of a circular contaminated area for different detection methods
referred to a background variation 6 N = No. The lower detection limit
will be quite insufficient if the radius is smaller than 100 m. Using the
results of Chamberlain et al. [2], we found a similar lower detection limit
for a combination of three NaI(Tl) crystals of 4ix 1 in.
If we assurne that only one calibration factor for the detection of 131I
should be used for the purpose of aerial surveys in emergency situations,
the contaminated area must be practically larger than 700 m in diameter.
The distance will be crossed in 20 sec at an aircraft speed of 120 km/h
01' in 60 sec at 40 km/ho It is reasonable to use a time constant in this
range. To obtain a useful estimation of the time constant, the statistical
deviation 2 ero is shown in Fig. 7 as a function of the ratemeter constant T,
the aircraft speed and the radius of the contaminated area R. In this
example the diameter 2 R of the contaminated area is crossed during a
time interval of foul' time constants 4 T. A longer time constant > 15 sec
will impair the local resolution without considerably improving the
sensitivity.
A systematic survey of small areas would require parallel flight routes
not more than 1 km apart. Searching over an area of 200 X 200 km, for
instance, the total flight route will be 40000 km, this would mean "Round
the world in 80 days".
For this reason it is also unrealistic to require airborne instruments
to be able to measure small areas of surface contamination. But then a
time constant of about 1 sec is not necessary at all. The lower detection
limit can be improved markedly by using long time constants, e. g. T = 15 sec.
This is especially true for G-M counters.
Figure 8 shows the smallest detectable 131I contamination for ideal
conditions, referred to the statistical deviation 6 N = 2 ero of the background
for the different/,measuring methods. The results are related to a flight
height of 80 m a.nd aratemeter time constant T = 15 sec. These values will
not be obtained uJder practical conditions of the measuring flight when we
base the lower detection limit on the possible doubling of the background
6 N = No. The sensitivity of the G-M counter used is lower by one decade
compared to the measurement of the toal count rate with the scintillation
detector. It is also noticeable that in this case the use of larger crystals
does not offer a remarkable advantage. On the other hand, the selective
131I measurement in the peak with background correction could be improved
to some degree by using larger crystals.
3.3. Composition of the released fission product mixture
After a nuclear accident it will only be possible to determine incomple-
tely the extension of the contaminated area and the degree of the contamina-
tion by theoretical conditions alone, even when the meteorological conditions
and the kind of emission are known. Therefore, different measuring
problems arise at the same time, depending on the individual emergency
situation, the composition of the fission product mixture and the extent and
amount of surface contamination. Because of the extent of the afflicted area
(up to 100 km from the place of accident), an aircraft will be required for
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FIG. 7. The lower detection limit for 1311 surface contamination in !lCi/m' derived from the statistical
deviation 2 0 = 2-#fo of the background No and the assumption that the flight time over the contamina ted
area is equal to four time constants 80 m above ground depending on time constant,flight speed and radius
of contaminated area.
a quicksurvey of the contaminated area and the determination of the surface
activity. Moreover, cars will be necessary to transport sampIes of grass,
soH and milk from theneighbourhood and to perform me asurements in con-
taminated locations which are of special interest [10] .
One of the most important prerequisites for the judgement of an emer-
gency situation will be the determination by spectroscopy of the 1311 fr action
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FIG.8. The smallest detectable 1311 surface contaminatIon in ILCi/m' derived from
_____ the variation of the background N =Nu
- - - - - - - the statIstical deviatIon of the background 6N = 200
80 m above ground over homogeneous infinite plane source, tIme constant 15 sec, for the different measuring
methods.
spectrum of the fission produet mixture changes rapidly within the first
hours after an accident and the determination of 1311 is disturbed by other
short-lived iodine nuclides. Experiments carried out in the Karlsruhe
Nuclear Research Centre showed that - even in favourable cases when
iodine is the only substance released - 1311 cannot be identified with sufficient
accuracy earlier than at least 6 to 10 hours after the accident [11 J. After
two short irradiations of a uranium sampIe in the reactor FR 2, iodine
was separated radiochemically. Figure 9 shows the gamma spectrum of
the iodine sampIe measured by a Ge( Li) semiconduetor detector three
hours after release of the iodirte. In the gamma speetrum the peaks of
1311 will be overlapped more or less by other short-lived iodine isotopes
like 1321, 1331, 134 1 and 1351, as weIl as by135h1Xe, depending on the type
of the accident and especially on the age and history of the fission product
mixture released. This situation will be still worse in cases where addi-
tional fission produets are released or where the speetroscopy is carried
out with a Nal(Tl) detector of lower resolution. So at least 24 hours will
be lost before exact statements on the activity Of 1311 within the fission
produet mixture can be made.
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FIG.9. The gamma spectrum of an iodine sampie separated chemically from natural uranium measured
3 to 5 hours after a reactor irradiation with a Ge(Li) detector. Peak No. 3: 1311, 360 keV [l1J.
With selective measuring instruments an aerial survey will therefore
be appropriate not earlier than 24 hours after the accident. On the other
hand, information flights with energy-independent dose ratemeters should
be carried out even within the first hours. Knowing the dose-rate above
ground, sufficiently exact values of the local131r surface activity can be
estimated at a later time. Then only the temporal decrease of the short-
lived components and the corresponding 131r fraction need be taken into
account. This information must be gained in the meantime from samples
measured in the laboratory.
An examination of different emergency situations reveals that not in
all cases should a sensitive 131r selective indicator be preferred for locating
the contaminated areas by aircraft. To explain this, Table II gives the
dose-rates arising from a 131r surface contamination of 0.4 MCi/m2 at a
distance of 90 m above ground 24 hours after the release of: a normal fission
product mixture (mainly 131r from disintegration of 131Te with a half-life
of 25 min); a fission product mixture after a 300-d irradiation of a fuel
element; volatile fission products (r, Te, Cs) in the composition present
after a 300-d irradiation of a fuel element; iodine alone.
With the assumption that the relative contribution of 131r to the total
gamma. dose-rate remains unchanged even at 80 m above ground, the lower
detection limit 2 (J has been calculated for the G-M counter type BZ 120
SM-lI7/15
TABLE H. CONTRIBUTION OF 1311 TO THE TOTAL DOSE-RATE OF
DIFFERENT FISSION PRODUCT MIXTURES 90 cm ABOVE GROUND
24 h AFTER RELEASE.
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Total dose-rate for an 1311 surface contamination of 0.4 MCi/m2 according
to Ref. [2J.
Fission product mixture
Total dose-rate Contribution from 1311
(fJR/h) (0/0)
1311 alone 3 100
Volatile fission products 27 11
Reactor fission products 115 2.6
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FlG.10. The lower detection limit for a 1311 surface contamination in ~Ci/m2 derived from the statistical
deviation 2 (J, 80 m above ground, time constant 15 sec depending on the composition of the fission product
mixture for the energy compensated G-M counter BZ 120 and for a selective 1311 measurement with a Nal(TI)
crystal (H X Hin. ).
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and the selective measurement of 1311 with the Na1(TI) crystal of 1t x 1tin.
(see Fig. 10).
Owing to the increase in the total radiation level caused by the fission
products, a simple dose ratemeter will be able to detect a small 1311
contamination with sufficient sensitivity. For a selective measuring method,
however, the other fission products increase the statistical deviation 2 CI
of the background. Measuring flights are therefore only one part of the
required measuring program in emergency situations. Without further
information they cannot indicate directly an iodine surface contamination
for the following reasons:
(a) The contribution of 131 land the composition of the deposited fission
product mixture change very quickly immediately after the accident.
(b) The gamma analysis of sampies and the successive measuring of
the gamma spectrum can be performed reasonably only in a
laboratory but not in an aircraft.
(c) The fast localization of contaminated areas and the determination of
the local distribution of the surface contamination must be done
by plane. To get an exact statement on the amount of the 1311
surface activity, the results of laboratory measurements must be
used in any case.
4. PRACT1CAL CHOICE OF MEASURING EQUIPMENT AFTER AN
ACCIDENT
The determination of the total gamma spectrum during an aerial
survey after an accident does not seem to be reasonable because of the long
measuring time, the tedious evaluation by graph of the iodine peak to esti-
mate an 1311 surface activity and, above all, the large number of spectra
which cannot be processed at once. Measuring the gamma spectrum while
crossing the contaminated area may be useful under certain circumstances
to identify the fission product mixture . Generally this can be done
much more easily and more accurately by measurements in the laboratory
where Ge(Li) semiconductor detectors instead of NaI crystals can be used.
Here, the change of the gamma spectrum of the same sampie can be obser-
ved in the period following the accident.
An iodine measurement with a single-channel analyser is not useful
because of the missing background compensation and a considerably lower
sensitivity compared with the measurement of the total count rate. A selec-
tive 1311 measurement could be performed with a 3-channel analyser. This
possibility has not yetbeen tested experimentally as the more complicated
electronics will give a background campensation but also unfavourable
statistics. Therefore the lower detection limit will be worse than the value
that could be expected,from the exact evaluation of the iodine peak in the
gamma spectrum. Compared with the measurement of the total count rate
with the same crystals, the lower detection limit will be worse by a decade.
Despite the advantage of discriminating automatically the variations in the
background, this measuring method would have the dis advantage of not
indicating any 1311 surface contamination in the presence of a fission product
mixture with a low or missing iodine fr action but also within the first hours
following the iodine emission. Therefore localization of the contaminated
area will not be possible with a 1311 selective indicator.
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Doubtless the highest sensitivity for detecting an 1311 surface contamina-
tion can be achieved by measuring the total count rate. But on account oi
the missing background compensation, the theoretical sensitivity cannot
be maintained under practical cdnditions. Owing to the temporal and local
variation of the background, only an 1311 surface contamination of more
than 1 IJ.Ci/m2 can be located, evenif the background is approximately
known from previous te st flights.
These conditions can scarcely be improved, whether by using larger
Na1(Tl) crystals or by using several crystals simultaneously. On the other
hand, dose ratemeters can be employed usefully for an airborne survey to
locate contaminated areas quickly, especially when fission product mixtures
are present. By using counter tubes with a lower self-aetivity and especial-
ly by using several tubes, the stated lower deteetion limit of an 1311 surface
contamination could be improved in future. For this purpose not only
energy-compensated G-M counter tubes are suitable, but also battery-
operated portable instruments with ionization chamberl3, proportional
counters or energy-independent plastic scintillation detectors. For these
measurement techniques, energy independence and insensitivity of the
detector to ß-radiation must, however, be provided.
When measuring the dose-rate, any dose ratemeter can be used which
is available. Special calibration of each instrument for an 1311 surface
activity is not necessary. The 1311 surface contamination can be calculated
from the corresponding dose-rate indication if the composition of the fission
product mixture is known. Measuring flights with dose ratemeters can
be periormed immediately after the accident at a moment when there is
not yet any information on the composition of the fission produet mixture.
Recording of the dose-rate at a given height together with the measuring
time and the position will give the raw data for a later estimation oi the
corresponding 1311 surface contamination. The composition of the fission
product mixture must be determined in the laboratory from the gamma
spectrum of a sampIe taken immediately after the accident and by successi-
vely observing the change of the spectrum. By means oi a suitable
computer pro gram and the assumption that the contaminated area is a
homogeneous infinite plane source, the dose-rate at a given height can be
calculated from the measured fission product spectrum. The corresponding
contribution oi 1311 to the total dose-rate and therefore the 1311 surface activity
can be stated for any location at the time of measurement.
As for all measuring methods, the lower deteetion limit of such measure-
ment is given by the temporal and local variation of the background. There-
fore test flights along a fixed route in the vicinity of nuclear installations
are necessary to a small extent to measure the amount of the natural
background and, most of all, its local variations under favourable weather
conditions. The value of expensive precision background measurements
seems to be doubtful. The influence of the normal radioaetive emission
of nuclear installations can multiply the dose-rate oi the background,
depending on the weather and wind conditions during the test or meal3uring
flight after an accident.
The question arises whether it is useful to demand a sensitive aetivity
measurement, especially a selective 131I measurement, for locating the
contaminated area by plane for the following reasons.
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In a nuclear accident when only iodine is released, primarily 132 1,
133 1, 1341, 135 I are encountered but not 131I,
The radiation sensitivity of the thyroid gland of children to incorporated
iodine from fall-out has been underestimated till now. On Rongelap,
Marshall Islands, 10 to 15 years after an incorporation of local fall-out,
unexpectedly heavy radiation damage of the thyroid glands was observed
in the inhabitants who were children at that time. In addition to 1311, the
isotopes 1331, 135 I and to less extent 1321 contributed significantly to the
thyroid dose (12].
In view of this the maximum permissible surface contamination for grass
should be smaller than the value used today (0.4 MCi/m2 ), which is based
on 1311 alone and a maximum permissible thyroid dose of 25 rem for
children.
From the measuring point of view, however, the location of areas
contaminated with smaller surface activities of 1311 is not possible, even
if larger Nal(TI) crystals are used.
Finally we can summarize that the use of aircraft for contamination
measurements in emergency situations is essentially limited to the fast
location of larger contaminated areas. The determination of an 1311
surface aetivity by plane can only be solved with sufficient accuracy by a
dose-rate measurement and calculations based on the corresponding gamma
spectrum at the moment of the measuring flight.
Under practical conditions and with the information of previous back-
ground measurements, the deteetors and the measuring methods available
today can detect an 1311 surface contamination of about 1 MCi/m2 •
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DISCUSSION ON SM-1l7/59 AND 15
G.R. PALMER: My comment is relevant to both papers and relates
to background levels and pre-emergency surveys. Following changes in
lCRP recommendations and reappraisal by the Medical Research Council
in the United Kingdom, we now have a new Emergency Reference Level
for milk which is reflected in a higher I permissible I level on grass.
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This higher level gives a very much higher radiation level to measure in
an emergency situation and makes it less important to know the precise
pre-emergency background level.
A second point, often forgotten, is that in an emergency, although the
contamination levels on the edge of the affected area are at the reference
level limit, contamination in the centre of the zone will be much higher.
The aerial survey after the Windscale incident ran into difficulty when all
the instruments went beyond the full-scale reading while the aircraft was
over the high - contamination zone.
Consequently we in the establishment I represent have reduced our
environmnetal surveying to a large survey twice a year as an emergency
exercise. This gives practice to all the people who might be involved in
an emergency survey, which is very important. A secondary advantage
is that we obtain sufficient information to prove to local authorities, etc.,
that all is well at the establishment and that there are no deteetable
effects in the countryside.
P.R. KAMATH: I would like to give some clarification of the back-
ground radiation values shown in Fig.2 of my paper. These were part of
pre-operational surveillance data used as a yardstick against which
operational practices could be assessed and exposures resulting from the
operations evaluated. The measurements of sediment activity offshore
and along the shore that have been carried out by Howells and Templeton
at vVindscale over aperiod of many years have demonstrated how ac-
tivity builds up and spreads in the environn'lent. I feel that background
measureluents are very necessary (of course properly programmed) as
an indication of an approaching hazardous build-up in the environment.
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
